Globalisation, trade liberalisation and economic development in the developing countries: An overview by SIDDIQUI, Kalim
Journal of Economics Library 
www.kspjournals.org 
Volume 4                          December 2017                           Issue 4 
 
Globalisation, trade liberalisation and economic development 
in the developing countries: An overview 
 
By Kalim SIDDIQUI1† 
 
Abstract. This article examines globalisation in the historical context and also its 
implications for development, especially in the developing countries. Economic 
globalisation means where all countries are developing their economies according to 
homogeneous rules and regulations formulated by international organisations such as the 
WTO, IMF and the World Bank. Globalisation refers to the opening of national markets 
and integration of production and increased operations of MNCs. It simply means nation-
states are not able to influence exports and imports of goods and capital. And trade 
liberalisation is seen as a crucial policy towards globalisation. This paper will critically 
analyse the theoretical justification for the policy of free trade. There seems to be no doubt 
that globalisation has opened up a number of beneficial avenues for those countries 
conducive to innovation and entrepreneurship. Yet in the developing countries the 
fundamental problem of unemployment, income inequality and poverty persists and a more 
integrated economy under current globalisation has not been successful in resolving the 
challenges and problems facing the people in developing countries. This study concludes 
that the political economy of globalisation seems to be another addition to the power of 
global capital over national capitalist development, which reflects crisis in capitalism due to 
the accumulation crisis.  
Keywords. Globalisation, WTO, Free trade, Institutions, Developing countries. 
JEL. F10, F13, F60. 
 
1. Introduction 
lobalisation has brought huge changes to people all over the world not 
always in a positive sense. The average real wages in the United States in 
2012 was no higher than in 1967 (Stiglitz, 2013) and at the same time job 
opportunities shrank because investors in the advanced economies are reallocating 
industries to low wage developing countries. This gives the impression that the 
latter group have benefitted from globalisation. This is not entirely correct; if we 
exclude China then we find such impressions are not correct. In fact, such 
reallocation since the early 1990s has been unable to make any breakthrough in the 
expansion of job opportunities in most of the developing countries.  
The term globalisation refers to the integration of the world’s economy through 
trade, financial flows and know-how. It is said that the opening up of markets and 
later on increased global integration have played a major role in expanding 
international trade and economic growth across the countries. Globalisation is often 
used in a positive sense to explain the integration process in the world economy 
(Banerjee et al., 2006). It is said to be an expansion of economic activities between 
countries in areas such as trade, foreign investment and capital flows. It also means 
more economic openness, but also increased flows of technology, ideas and 
cultural exchange among countries. Increased transactions and the integration of 
markets for goods, services and capital were aimed towards the formation of global 
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demands and markets, while at the same time big businesses were facilitated 
towards globalised production setups through horizontal and vertical integration on 
the supply side. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: the introduction discusses the issues of 
globalisation and lays out the aims and significance of this paper. Section 2 
examines globalisation in the historical process and section 3 analyses free trade 
and the controversies around the term globalisation. Section 4 considers 
globalisation and the role of institutions, especially in developing countries and 
finally section 5 concludes the findings.  
Drawing upon a range of theory and evidence, the study considers the 
implications of globalisation. This paper seeks to establish the view of how 
globalisation should be looked at in totality. Globalisation has been widely debated 
from a number of perspectives. There is clear evidence that China and other East 
Asian economies have experienced higher economic growth and diversion of their 
economies, which are claimed to be due to integration with the global economy and 
to pursuing free-market policies (Siddiqui, 2016a; Banerjee et al., 2006). 
It is relevant here to elaborate briefly on the Japanese economist Nakayama 
Ichiro who, during the post-war reconstruction of the country, came out as very 
critical of ‚modern theory‛, which saw that rapid economic growth alone would 
make Japan a developed nation. Ichiro was worried that economic growth that did 
not take into account the social and political changes accompanying it would be 
counter-productive and in future could create more problems than it intended to 
solve. Therefore, he insisted that political reform from below seemed more urgent 
than economic engineering from the top. Nakayama Ichiro argued that high growth 
can empower in an unequal society a few individuals or business groups, while 
leaving behind the vast majority of the people (Hein, 1994). 
Large populated countries such as India, Bangladesh, China, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Pakistan and others (Siddiqui, 2009) have two distinct sectors: the first with 
modern technology, a high ratio of capital to labour, high productivity and wages; 
and the second with low productivity and wages. Rapid unbalanced growth could 
aggravate difficulties for the ‚dual structure‛ and could have serious political 
consequences (Siddiqui, 2017). If a country develops without the rural population 
into modern sectors, it is vulnerable to social unrest and authoritarian tendencies. 
Japan’s successful post-war economic development was due to a number of factors 
including the Korean War, infusion of technology, aid, active industrial policy, 
land reforms and state intervention in the markets; and also through investment in 
the education and health sectors, which helped to create a skilled and productive 
labour force for an expanding modern economy (Siddiqui, 2015a). Recent study on 
globalisation by Anwar Shaikh (2016: 759) concludes ‚Globalization involved 
colonization, force, pillage, slavery, slaughters of native peoples, the targeted 
destruction of potential competitors, and a huge transfer of wealth into the rich 
countries.‛ 
The study will briefly examine globalisation in the historical context and also its 
implications for development, especially in the developing countries, and the 
historical materialism that emphasises the role of social forces.  
Economic globalisation means where all countries are developing their 
economies according to homogeneous rules and regulations formulated by 
international organisations such as the World Bank, IMF and WTO. Moreover, in 
order to understand globalisation, we need to analyse its three key important 
components, namely trade, investment and finance. Foreign capital investment was 
important to raise profits and control over natural resources. The current 
globalisation is associated with the financialisation of the world economy 
(Siddiqui, 2008), which means expansion of financial markets, an increase in the 
portion of income generated by the financial sector worldwide. It also means 
reductions in regulatory restrictions and further fuelling of global capital flows 
with a profound impact on global and national economies. It seems that 
competition is no longer over territory, but the ability to capture market share of 
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high-value added knowledge intensive technology and a further rise in rent 
extraction arising from knowledge control by the big global monopolies (Li & 
Zhou, 2015). 
There were two phases of globalisation. The first phase was between 1860 and 
1913 and the second phase began slowly in the 1950s, but was only limited to the 
few developed economies of West Europe and North America. However, in the 
1980s the international debt crisis and mismanagement provided an opportunity for 
the IMF and World Bank to impose a ‘Structural Adjustment Programme’ (SAP) in 
developing countries. The opening up of domestic markets was one key element of 
the SAP. Moreover, the final success came with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
the early 1990s and the globalisation project received a further boost and almost 
the entire world’s economy was open for trade and capital liberalisation (Siddiqui, 
1994). The World Bank, IMF and WTO remain important institutions for global 
governance in which international rules are elaborated, decisions are made and 
agreements are reinforced. 
Globalisation is not new. Actually such attempts were made by the British 
earlier in the second half of the 19th century and continued until the beginning of 
World War I, when they were an imperial power; i.e. Britain was willing to 
implement open trade and free flow of goods and services across borders, but after 
that such efforts were brought to an end. During the last quarter of the 19th century, 
international trade increased rapidly. The statistics show that between 1870 and 
1913 world trade rose to an average of around 3.9% annually, which was much 
faster than the growth of world output, i.e. 2.5% annually (Maddison, 1989). 
Another estimate by Michie & Kitson (1995) found the growth rate for the same 
periods respectively averaged 3.5% and 2.7% annually. The data of the share of 
world trade and output is also available for selected regions. For Western countries, 
for instance, the share of exports in GDP rose from 13.6% in 1870 to 18.3% in 
1913 (Bairoch & Kozul-Wright, 1996). However, smaller European countries such 
as Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland’s share of exports in GDP was much 
higher than the large European countries such as Britain, France and Germany 
(Maddison, 1989). 
The first phase of globalisation witnessed a rapid technological development 
and rapid transformation in communication and transportation with the 
introduction of steam engine, the railways, and the telegraphs in the second half of 
the 19th century. This also coincided with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, 
which halved the distance between London and Bombay and thus reduced both the 
journey time and cost of travelling. 
With the advent of globalisation in the 1980s, the flow of capital was given 
freedom to move and international trade has been further liberalised, crossing 
boundaries of countries. Of course, globalisation is by no means an economic 
phenomenon only, but also manifests itself in a number of aspects including social, 
cultural, and language. However, our current study will focus largely on the 
economic aspects of globalisation. Ecker-Ehrhardt argues (2014:1 276) that: 
‚Economic globalisation …has had far reaching repercussions for domestic politics 
by fomenting conflicts between the ‘winners’ and the ‘losers’ on a highly 
competitive world market, resulting from intensified exchange relations between 
societies.‛  
 
2. Globalisation in historical process 
Globalisation is not merely a contemporary event, but rather a process started 
long before the last decade of the 20th century; in fact it started in the 18th and 19th 
century with colonisation and the consequent global capital expansion. In the 19th 
century Marx and Engels observed the phenomenon of globalisation: ‚The 
bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of 
production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole 
relations of society… The need of a constantly expanding markets for its products 
chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle 
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everywhere, settle everywhere, and establish connections everywhere. The 
bourgeoisies has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan 
character to production and consumption in every country‛ (cited in Wang, 2015). 
As Stephen (2014: 918) points out: ‚capitalism’s outward expansionary forces 
confront porous borders, in which the scales of political and economic processes 
are allowed to diverge, the control of territory is dissociated from market access, 
and the free development of an independent world capitalist economy can unfold. 
Historically, this can be taken the form of empires of free trade and regimes of 
multilateral liberalization. Under such conditions, divisions of labour and 
functional differentiation can be left to develop in tandem with state power 
accumulation…‛ He further notes: ‚The Allied victory in the Second World War 
allowed the US and its allies to shift the governance of global capitalism from a 
highly ‘nationalized’ order of neo-mercantilism to one to one of liberal 
multilateralism and neoliberal globalisation‛ (Stephen, 2014: 918). 
The expansion of grain imports into the UK began with the repeal of the Corn 
Law in 1846 and soon after, in 1860, the signing of the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty 
between France and Britain led to a cut in tariffs in bilateral trade. As a result, 
exports in both agricultural and non-agricultural products rose to an average of 
3.5% per annum between 1850 and 1913, which was much more than the average 
agricultural growth rate of 1.1% per annum for the same period (Rodrik, 2012).  
Britain, after the second half of the 19th century, took a number of initiatives 
towards liberalising trade and removing barriers to trade. For example, Britain 
signed a trade treaty with France in 1860. Other European countries such as 
France, Germany and Italy brought down tariff duties to a range of 10-20%. Britain 
and the Netherlands continued free trade policies during this period; while the US 
followed trade restrictions throughout the period of 1870-1913 with a tariff rate as 
high as 40-50% on manufactured goods (Chang, 2002). Ha-Joon Chang found in 
general that the West practised protection wherever necessary, but imposed free 
trade on their colonies and semi-colonies.  
In the colonies, European powers imposed free trade. As Nayyar (2006:139) 
notes, ‚in 1842 China signed a treaty with Britain which opened its market to trade 
and capped tariffs at 5%. In the 1840s, free trade was imposed on India by Britain 
and on Indonesia by Netherlands. In 1858, Japan signed the Shimoda-Harris 
treaties, persuaded by the American gunboats of Commodore Perry, to switch from 
autarchy to free trade: Korea followed the same path, through its market integration 
with Japan. Similar treaties, which put a ceiling of 5% on import duties, were 
imposed on most Latin American countries somewhat earlier. This was achieved 
through British gunboat diplomacy‛. 
Angus Maddison (1989) calculated that India had a share of 27% of the world 
trade in 1700, which declined to merely 3% in 1947, the time India became 
independent. The reason for the sharp fall was twofold: the deliberate destruction 
of India’s industry, especially the textile industry, and the transfer of money from 
India to Britain, referred to as a tribute paid by the colonial government to Britain. 
According to other estimate, nearly 5% per cent of India’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) was transferred annually to Britain by various means (Siddiqui, 1990). 
Prior to colonisation of the Indian economy, during the first half of the 18th 
century the agriculture sector was very productive, as the surplus was largely 
invested back into the sector and India had comparative advantage in the 
production of cotton textiles – cheap but high quality calicoes – which were then 
produced at low cost. Since the raw material was produced locally and food was 
cheap, all this contributed to the lower prices of cotton goods. The cotton export 
industries were largely located in Bengal, Gujarat, Madras and Punjab (Alavi, 
1982). 
Soon after the occupation of Bengal, the colonial administration had increased 
rents and introduced the ‘permanent settlement’ of the land revenue in 1793. This 
required payment based on the potential value of the land whether there was a good 
harvest or not. Between 1793 and 1814, the land revenue collection in Bengal rose 
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sharply from £817,553 to £2,680,000. A large proportion of the revenue generated 
was either transferred to Britain or spent on wars to preserve imperial interests and 
little was reinvested in plantations, mining and infrastructure (Alavi, 1982).  
As a result, most of the surplus generated was transferred to the metropolis 
countries and thus they were in a position to export capital to their colonies. Some 
money was invested in plantations, mining, railways and the telegraph, which was 
to benefit the metropolis countries (Bairoch & Kozul-Wright, 1996). Moreover, the 
total share of British investments into Europe and the US dropped from 52% to 
26% between 1870 and 1913, while at the same time capital investment in Latin 
America and the British colonies in Asia rose from 33% to 55% of the total for the 
same period (Kenwood, & Lougheed, 1994: 30). 
The economic relationship between the metropolis and the colonies remained 
very unequal; the growth did not converge and the economic growth rates in the 
metropolis were much higher than their colonies – thus, such development widened 
the income gaps further. For example, in the colonies on average, the growth in 
GNP per capita only rose from –0.2% annually during 1830 to 1870 to just 0.1% 
annually during 1870-1890 and 0.6% during 1890-1913 annually (Siddiqui, 1990), 
while in the metropolis (i.e. imperial countries) corresponding growth rates were 
0.6%, 1% and 1.7% annually for the same periods. The development of modern 
industries was largely confined to the metropolis countries and in 1870 two-fifths 
of the industrial production was based in Europe and North America, which further 
went up to 60% by 1913. As a result, a handful of industrialised countries 
experienced development in modern industries and technology and convergence in 
incomes and prices, but the same was not true for their colonies. 
Therefore, the gains of economic liberalisation during the first phase of 
globalisation were largely confined to the metropolis countries, which were able to 
export capital and control high technology, while although the colonies did 
experience an increase in trade, at the same time they also experienced de-
industrialisation. During this period new international divisions of labour emerged 
and the income gaps between the colonies and metropolis widened. For example, 
the income gaps between the metropolis and colonies was 3:1 in 1820, which rose 
to 7:1 in 1870 and further rose to 11:1 in 1913 (Maddison, 1989). On the one hand, 
colonial rule saw the rapid increase in trade and integration of the their economies 
with the metropolis, but on the other hand large populated countries such as China, 
India and Indonesia also experienced destruction of their handicraft industries and 
poverty (Alavi, 1982). 
Rosa Luxemburg (1968) emphasised the existence of a pre-capitalist periphery 
and its destruction provided a rise in the demand for a capitalist sector, which is a 
prerequisite for accumulation under capitalism. It means the presence of a pre-
capitalist sector is an ‚inducement‛ to investment. The opening up of external 
markets can cause a net increase in investment or consumption because the opening 
of new areas or regions would require more investment such as increased demands 
for industrial goods and transportation. However, such situation cannot go on 
forever, with the exhaustion and undermining of capitalist accumulation leading to 
stagnation and crisis.  
 
3. Free trade policy argument 
Trade liberalisation is seen as a crucial policy towards globalisation. Theoretical 
justification is provided for the policy of free trade and also claimed that trade 
liberalisation induces economic growth, and examples of East Asian economies are 
often cited (Williamson, 1996) as having better economic performance against the 
less free trade countries of African and South America. It is generalised that 
countries with abundant land and labour (Africa) should focus production and 
exports of land intensive commodities and import manufactured goods from 
countries that are land scarce and have abundant capital and technology (Europe), 
and that these countries should produce and export capital intensive manufactured 
goods and import land and labour intensive goods.  
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David Ricard’s (1819) book on the Principles of Political Economy and 
Taxation argued that by the extension of free trade or by improvements in 
machinery, food prices would be reduced, and wages would fall as a result, leading 
to a rise in profits. Ricardo suggested that each country should specialise in the 
production of goods for which it has comparative advantage and then trade them. 
Ricardo’s key argument in support of comparative advantage and free trade is 
based on the hope that specialising in the production of some commodity is 
inherently better because of the comparatively lower labour time involved in 
production. As Joan Robinson (1979) stated, ‚Ricardo’s analysis of comparative 
advantage is often misunderstood. The comparison is not between the costs of 
production, in money terms, of particular commodities at home and abroad; it is a 
comparison between the real costs (in terms of labour and other resources) of 
different commodities at home. The argument was that, when protection is taken 
off, resources will move from the production of commodities with high real costs 
(which can then be imported) to those with lower real costs so that their 
productivity is increased‛ (Robinson, 1979: 102-103). 
Globalisation is based on ‘free trade’ theory that draws arguments from David 
Ricardo’s famous example that both England and Portugal would gain by adopting 
a trade liberalisation policy, meaning England specialising in the production of 
textiles and Portugal in wine. It claimed that by pursuing free trade consumption 
both countries would have higher returns than in the absence of trade. However, it 
did not elaborate on the fact that England’s textile industry, with its spillover links 
to machine tools and steam engines, had room for further productivity 
improvements in many other industries, while Portugal’s focus on wine had very 
limited spillover effects and linkages to other industry and thus very little scope for 
wider technological impact. As a result, Portugal’s flourishing textile industry was 
wiped out and England’s investors took over Portugal’s vineyards as their owners 
borrowed from London’s banks and Portugal became the poorest countries in 
Europe.  
Erik Reinert (2007) criticised Ricardo’s arguments which assume that if 
Portugal focuses on the production of wine, then most likely it would be caught in 
diminishing returns and rising costs of production and later on the country would 
fail to industrialise and diversify its economy, which is the key for any successful 
transition to become developed and rich. Reinert (2007: 302) argues: ‚It is 
important to understand that … [Ricardo’s] theory represents the world economy 
as a process of bartering of labour hours which are devoid of any skills or other 
characteristics. A labour hour in Silicon Valley equals a labour hour in a refugee 
camp in Darfur in the Sudan. Ironically, capitalist trade theory in its purest form 
does not consider the role of capital; instead it is based on the labour theory of 
value. Therefore, it does not consider the one country’s production process might 
potentially absorb much knowledge and capital (like Microsoft products) while the 
other country’s production process might remain highly labour-intensive, processes 
where capital cannot profitably be employed…‛ (Reinert, 2007: 303).  
In fact, most of the developing countries focus in the production of commodities 
that have generally these following characteristics: they are subject to diminishing 
rather than increasing returns and often the fruits of improving productivity, 
efficiency and fruits of learning are passed to the customers in the developed 
countries in the form of lower prices rather than benefiting the local producers. The 
developing countries often exports commodities where the key elements to achieve 
increasing returns to scale are absent, meaning little or no technical change and no 
synergies and these are ones bearing the damage.  
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Figure 1. Trade in Goods and Services, Exports as % of GDP, 1990 – 2016 
Source: Accessed November 10, 2017. [Retrieved from]. 
 
 
Figure 2. Trade in Goods and Services forecastImports, annual growth rate (%), 1990 – 
2018. 
Note: US shown in green colour, India in blue, OECD in orange, China in red and Japan in violet. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook: Statistics and Projections. [Retrieved from]. 
 
 
Figure 3. Trade in goods and services forecast net trade, 2006-2018 (US$) 
Source: OECD database. Accessed November 4, 2017.  [Retrieved from]. 
Note: China in red colour, OECD in black, India violet, and US in blue. 
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Figure 4. Domestic value added in total gross exports (%), 1994 – 2014 
Source: Accessed November 10, 2017. [Retrieved from]. 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s a number of measures were undertaken by the 
developing countries towards pro-market reforms, including trade liberalisation 
and export promotions. However, in most countries imports rose much higher than 
exports and also not all countries experienced similar growth in international trade. 
As shown in Figure 1 between 1990 – 2016China’s exports in goods and servicesas 
% of GDP rose sharply, while India’s exports rose at lower rate for the same 
periods. Annual growth of imports for both countries rose from 2001 to 2005, but 
between 2005 and 2012, India’s imports growth rates were higher than China (See 
Figure 2). 
Figure 3 shows the net trade in goods and services from 2006-2018 for China 
seems to be a bit better, India net trade witnessed slight fall, and OECD has 
improved considerably, while US saw slight improvement. We also find 
international trade rapidly declined for all countries between 2007 and 2009,which 
also coincided with the global financial crisis, and after 2010 began to pick-up 
again. Figure 4 indicates that the domestic value added content in total gross 
exports as a percentage has risen sharply in Brazil, China has also improved. While 
India’sdomestic value added in total gross exports as percentage has declined 
steadily for the same period. 
Moreover, the theory of comparative advantage focuses on economic growth, 
increased international trade, while neglecting income distribution and inequality 
(Zhou et. al., 2011). It is known that NAFTA has brought large material gains to 
US and Canadian based MNCs (Multinational Corporations) and their top 
executives, and also to Mexican elites, but the same is not true for the workers and 
small producers in Mexico. The free trade deal has stimulated capital inflows and 
investment in certain industries and increased trade. However, Mexico’s average 
economic growth has been much lower than other Latin American countries and 
wages in the manufacturing sectors have stagnated for the last two decades (Li, & 
Zhou, 2015). 
International institutions claim that globalisation and free market policies would 
lead to rapid growth and higher employment and prosperity. However, after more 
than three decades of pursuing such policies the statistics show that globalisation 
and economic reforms have promoted inequality and poverty, increased economic 
vulnerability and consolidated economic stagnation in most of the developing 
countries (Zhou et. al., 2011). Despite the weak empirical evidence, mainstream 
economists are dutifully repeating mantra that economic liberalisation promotes 
growth and prosperity.  
Pillai’s (2011) studies on globalisation concluded that low income countries had 
benefitted from increased opportunities for exports and imports. Other studies such 
as Jaumotte et. al., (2013) found that the role of technology and globalisation leads 
in rising income inequality. They concluded that income inequality increased due 
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to technological changes, while the impact of globalisation was restricted to limited 
areas in most of the developing countries. They suggest that increased trade 
reduces income inequality, whereas financial globalisation, especially capital 
inflows, increases income inequality (Li, & Zhou, 2015). 
Han et. al., (2012) studied the impact of globalisation on income inequality in 
urban China on the basis of data for 1988-2008. China’s global integration with 
WTO membership has widened wage inequality especially in regions that were 
more open for exports (Siddiqui, 2016c) and as a result such regions have become 
integrated with the global economy. Their studies contradict the predictions 
implied by the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO hereafter) model. The model claims that free 
trade policy will lead to convergence in incomes and prices among trading nations. 
For example, another study by Goldberg & Pavcnik (2007) found a widening wage 
gap between skilled and unskilled labourers in developing countries, which goes 
against the predictions made by the H-O model. They concluded that capital 
inflows into developing countries require the use of an increased proportion of 
technology which moves in favour of the increasing demand for skilled labour. 
Multinational corporations occupy a commanding role and at present the largest 
500 account for over 90 per cent of the world’s stock of foreign direct investment 
and about 50 per cent of global trade. This means that MNCs are more important 
than ever in the past and there is no sign that this increasing trend will be reversed 
in the near future. Increase in the power of corporations also means a rise in profits, 
due to the threat of moving production to other countries, resulting in stagnation in 
wages, which increases inequality. As a consequence, such policies will affect the 
demand side and will depress aggregate consumption. The demand management 
under globalisation is more problematic, especially based on the nation-state. For 
example, an increase in fiscal expenditure will generate a balance of payments 
deficit and that will send the wrong signals to foreign investors, which means 
depressing wages is crucial to maintain attractiveness for foreign investors. For 
MNCs, domestic demand may be less important as they are satisfied by global 
markets and this is being currently experienced in India, where economic growth is 
not paralleled by growth in employment (Siddiqui, 2016b). 
Have the developing countries really benefitted from globalisation in 
modernising their economies? If we look at globalisation’s origin from an 
economic and historical perspective, we may find thatglobalisation has already had 
a long history within economic and social terms. Some scholars have pointed out 
that the advent of globalisation is no less than a miracle, enabling China ‚one of the 
globe’s poorest countries‛ before its reforms, to ‚become a booming economy-
second biggest in the world’ in the present century‛ (Wang, 2015: 2060). Wang 
further adds, ‚Globalisation, especially economic globalisation, could not, 
however, have grown up on this poor soil without the Chinese economy having 
developed by leaps and bounds in the past decade‛ (Wang, 2015: 2060). 
China is seen as one of the biggest winners of globalisation; it was due to its 
rapid economic growth in the past few decades, since the government began the 
economic reforms and opened its economy to foreign capital and technology in 
1978 (Siddiqui, 2015b). It quickly adopted the regulation demanded by global 
companies and foreign investors. Now the country has become the second largest 
economy in the world, with GDP ranking second to the United States (Wang, 2015: 
270). China is often portrayed as a success story of globalisation. However, the 
country needs to solve many emerging problems, including environmental, 
pollution and the sharp widening differences between rich and poor.  
Initially China started with labour and resource intensive industries and later on 
gradually moved to higher manufacturing and electronics industries. These sectors 
have attracted huge amounts of foreign investment and China has established itself 
as a ‘world factory’ and has become an important player in the globalisation 
(Siddiqui, 2015b). The model of an egalitarian planned economy has been 
discarded and a market developmental model based on export-oriented economic 
strategy has been adopted. This strategy besides delivering massive growth has 
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caused a high level of pollution. It has also led to a huge income gap or the Gini 
Co-efficient. 
There is critique of globalisation and trade liberalisation, such as that of John 
Pilger who argues that, ‚Global economy is a modern Orwellian term. On the 
surface, it is instant financial trading, mobile phones, McDonald’s, Starbucks, 
holidays booked on the net. Behind this glass, it is the globalisation of poverty, a 
world where most human beings never make a phone call and live on less than two 
dollars a day, where 6,000 children die every day from diarrhoea because most 
have no access to clean water. In this world, unseen by most of us in the global 
north, a sophisticated system of plunder has forced more than ninety countries into 
‘structural adjustment’ programmes since the eighties, widening the divide between 
rich and poor as never before‛ (Pilger, 2002: 2). 
 
4. Globalisation and institutions 
During the second half of the 19th century, there was a sharp reduction in 
transportation and communication costs and most parts of the world were directly 
or indirectly under European control and the state was able to strictly implement a 
set of rules to facilitate the process of globalisation. Thus, it was not ‘invisible 
hands’ of the market but ‘visible hands’ of the state that helped to provide guidance 
and support to the process of globalisation. Therefore, we find the role of the state 
in the current process of globalisation is missing (Girdner, & Siddiqui, 2008), as 
most countries are independent and some sort of responsive democracy exists, 
which is very different from past globalisation.  
It is useful to analyse both the similarities and the differences between these two 
phases of globalisation. The differences between the two phases of globalisation 
are important to analyse here. During the first phase, inter-sectoral trade had 
occurred where colonies began to specialise in the export of primary commodities, 
and began to import manufactured goods from the metropolis. This new 
development led to a new international division of labour where colonies 
specialised in the production of raw materials, while the manufactured goods and 
high technology was produced by the metropolis. Nearly all colonies typically were 
encouraged to produce a handful of commodities where competition became 
intense which led to a fall in their export prices and as a result mass poverty and 
the occurrence of famines. As for example, Erik Reinert (2007: 99) states that ‚in 
the late 1600s, Ireland – a British colony – was about to take lead in the most 
important industry of the time, the production of woollen cloth. A flow of skilled 
Catholic immigrants from the continent had contributed to this development. 
English producers of woollen cloth – who in their turn were fighting a winning 
battle with the wool industry of Florence – could not afford to lose her comparative 
edge to the Irish. They successfully petitioned the English King at prohibit all 
exports of woollen cloth from Ireland from 1699… killing the manufacturing 
sector and forcing the Irish to send their raw wool to England was tantamount to 
reducing the country to poverty‛. 
However, during the second phase of globalisation we find that the 
industrialised countries with the removal of trade barriers increased intra-trade 
which was based on absolute advantage. In this phase, the factor endowments and 
increased technological application and rise in productivity brought down prices 
and competition between firms became more intense. Intra-trade in manufactured 
goods rose rapidly as it is based on product differentiation, marketing and 
economies of scale.  
In the first phase of globalisation there was hardly any restriction of migration 
and people did not require any documents to travel abroad, particularly Europeans. 
Between 1870 and 1914 more than 50 million Europeans left to live in North 
America, Argentina, Brazil, Australia, New Zealand and Southern Africa. For 
some European countries, emigration was huge as between 20% and 40% of their 
total population left the country. However, in the colonies, after the abolition of 
slavery by Britain, about 50 million people migrated from China and India as 
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indentured labour to work on the plantations, mines and railways owned by 
Europeans in Fiji, Mauritius, South Africa, and Caribbean and Latin American 
countries. However, in the second phase of globalisation, despite some European 
countries such as Germany inviting guest workers to work in their industries, 
migration was restricted and immigration laws were put in place.  
The mainstream economists imply a convergence with the institutions in the 
developed countries and they also assumed that institutional reforms can be 
achieved by some sort of social engineering. However, in contrast, studies on 
varieties of capitalism show that institutions are not the products of social 
engineering but have evolved and developed historically. They have developed 
organically in tandem with other institutions. According to Bruno Amable, 
‚Different economic models are not simply characterized by different institutional 
forms, but also by particular patterns of interaction between complementary 
institutions which are the core characteristics of these models. Institutions are not 
simply devices which would be chosen by ‘social engineers’ in order to perform a 
function as efficiently as possible; they are the outcome of a political economy 
process‛ (cited in Pieterse, 2015: 1992).  
Other critiques have also pointed out that globalisation means the state has 
‘withered away’, which seems to be incorrect. As Boris Kagarlitsky emphasises, 
‚Globalisation does not mean the impotence of the state, but the rejection by the 
state of its social functions, in favour of repressive ones, and the ending of 
democratic freedoms‛ (cited in Pilger, 2002: 5). Also Amit Bhaduri argues that, 
‚Multinational firms with subsidiaries in many countries weakened considerably 
the ability of governments to collect taxes, as foot loose corporations could show 
their profit in the countries with lower tax rates through ‘creative’ transfer pricing, 
sub-contracting and threatening to move to more hospitable climates for 
investment‛ (Bhaduri, 2014: 393-94). 
The process of globalisation and political democracy in nation-states is difficult 
to pursue together. And capital liberalisation seems to be an important element of 
the current globalisation project (Siddiqui, 2016c). Economies have become global, 
but policies remain nation-state. Dani Rodrik (2012) argues that if a country would 
like to be responsive to local democratic aspirations and demands then it would be 
difficult to adopt some of the globalisation policies and global economic 
integration and he says globalisation may involve sacrificing the democratic 
policies of the nation-state, where the government is supposed to be accountable to 
the people who have elected them.  
Deepak Nayyar (2015) argues that, ‚There are striking asymmetries. National 
boundaries should not matter for trade flows and capital flows but should be clearly 
demarcated for technology flows and labour flows. It follows that developing 
countries would provide access to their markets without a corresponding access to 
technology and would accept capital mobility without a corresponding provision 
for labour mobility. This implies more openness in some spheres but less openness 
in other spheres. The contrast between the free movement of capital and the unfree 
movement of labour across the national boundaries lies at the heart of the 
inequality in the rules of the game‛ (Nayyar, 2015: 50-51). 
The other key difference between current globalisation and other previous 
attempts at globalisation is that current globalisation is characterised not just by a 
mobility of capital across the globe but also by mobility of production. Global 
corporations are trying to take advantage of the low wages prevailing in developing 
countries and are shifting their production activities. This is not due to meeting 
local demands or creating employment but to meeting the international consumers’ 
demands.  
The key supporter of globalisation is finance capital and under such 
circumstances the nation-state autonomy is being undermined. Governments have 
to be more sensitive not to upset the ‚confidence of foreign investors‛, otherwise 
due to lack of any restriction on cross-border capital movements, foreign capital 
would flow out of the country, leaving a sharp fall in investment, employment, and 
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a sudden economic and financial crisis (Siddiqui, 2010). Therefore, governments 
have to adhere to the demands of international financial capital, which favours 
lower taxes on corporations and ‚sound finances‛, which would mean keeping 
fiscal deficit low as a proportion of GDP. Thus, national governments’ ability to 
undertake Keynesian style demand management becomes impossible.  
The question arises, why is international capital is worried about fiscal deficit? 
It seems it is due to fears of inflation and exchange rate depreciation, because 
government intervention to rescue the economy could legitimise and create support 
in favour of government that could undermine the ‚animal spirit‛ of the capitalist.  
Globalisation has encouraged a shift from the domestic market to overseas 
markets, later on gaining steady importance. This means not only greater reliance 
on the trade of goods and services but also reliance on foreign capital. Foreign 
capital inflow to India has risen sharply from merely US$ 0.1 billion a year during 
1978-1990 to more than US$ 9.5 billion annually in 1991-2012. As a result, India 
has become the second largest FDI recipient after China in recent years (Siddiqui, 
2016b). 
Financial liberalisation, based on economic policy, which is being initiated by 
the developed countries, has brought radical changes both at the local and 
international levels (Girdner, & Siddiqui, 2008). For example, within the developed 
countries it has increased the influence of financial capitalism. Moreover, it may 
have a significant impact on the financial sovereignty of countries and how to 
protect the interest of developing countries seems to a be a big challenge faced by 
them, as their financial sectors are less developed compared to the developed 
countries. It seems that for the last three decades in the developed countries the 
financial sector has acquired greater influence, and wealth has been created largely 
through this sector rather than from the production of goods (Li, & Zhou, 2015).  
The international credit rating agencies exert a very strong influence and among 
them only the three largest credit rating agencies, Fitch, Moody, and Standard & 
Poor, control almost 95% of global rating market share. If these international credit 
agencies downgrade credit ratings, it can cause severe vitality in financial markets, 
and that can force a government to alter its economic policy. For instance, during 
the global financial crisis of 2008, the credit agencies downgraded the credit 
ratings of Greece, Portugal and Spain and soon after these countries were forced to 
adopt austere fiscal policies; as a result the populations of these countries had to 
suffer severe socio-economic crisis. Developing countries are more vulnerable to 
external shocks and thus it becomes difficult to implement sovereign decisions to 
pursue a monetary policy according to their own national interest.  
Financial sovereignty is defined as the right of countries to make decisions on 
financial matters and to pursue a financial policy that is suitable for the levels of 
the individual country’s development, as financial systems play an important role 
in the allocation of financial resources in order to promote and develop certain 
domestic industries. Furthermore, a country must have policy flexibility in order to 
make sovereign policies regarding money supplies, interest rates and exchange 
rates; all these important policies should be under the control of the country’s 
central banks for the purpose of promoting employment creation and economic 
development. Globalisation reduces the economic policy spacefor developing 
countries. Dani Rodrik (2012) argues, ‚... as economies grow and geographical 
mobility increases, the need for clear and extensive rules and more reliable 
enforcement becomes paramount. The only countries that have managed to become 
rich under capitalism are those that have erected an extensive set of formal 
institutions that govern markets: tax systems that pay for public goods such as 
national defence and infrastructure, legal regimes that establish and protect 
property rights, courts that enforce contracts, police forces to sanction violators, 
bureaucrats who design and administer economic regulations, central banks that 
ensure monetary and financial stability and so on‛ (Rodrik, 2012: 15-16).  
Under de-regulated capital markets, currencies are competing with each other 
and also have options to be able keep their money in local or foreign currencies. 
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This leads to financial vulnerability and makes it difficult for the developing 
countries to manage and control macro-economic policy. As Li & Zhou (2015) 
emphasised, ‚Because of asymmetry between developed countries and developing 
countries with regard to the level of economic and financial development, 
monetary authorities in developing countries are more likely to be affected by 
globalisation of financial capital and financial capitalism in the formation and 
implementation of financial policies. Globalisation of financial capital and 
financial capitalism has led to a rise in the share of financial transactions 
undertaken in currencies such as the US dollar and euro. Consequently, the 
liquidity provision and the lender-of-last resort functions of the central banks of 
other countries, especially of developing countries, are being challenged‛ (Li, & 
Zhou, 2015:180). 
It is almost impossible to have an independent monetary policy under the 
control of sovereign government and at the same time an open capital account and 
fixed exchange rates; it is possible to follow only two of the three. For example, if 
a country would like to have a fixed exchange rate and autonomy in monetary 
policy, it must give up capital mobility. In the second scenario, suppose a country 
chooses capital mobility and fixed exchange rate, then it must abandon autonomy 
in monetary policy. In the third scenario, if a country desires to have autonomy in 
monetary policy and capital mobility then to keep a fixed exchange rate is not 
possible.  
There are differences across nations on the basis of history, culture, norms, level 
of incomes, living conditions, democratic institutions and so on. All these results 
create different preferences and national requirements. Therefore, we must 
recognise the centrality of the nation-state, which is more likely to contribute to 
better prospects of a global economy than ignoring the reality on the ground. John 
Gray (1999) described the neoliberal globalisation project as a threat to pluralism 
and human well-being. His arguments are based on Karl Polanyi’s ideas that the 
market is not a natural phenomenon or a spontaneous order but has been developed 
by the state’s active intervention and can only be sustained and strengthened by the 
state.  
Globalisation has brought a number of changes, including a shift in structural 
power from national governments to global corporations and global markets. Under 
such circumstances, Keynesian demand management to achieve full employment 
for a national government would be difficult to maintain; and also increased capital 
mobility, especially under current globalisation, has rendered any effective national 
economic policy almost impossible (Siddiqui, 2012). National governments have to 
compete against other countries in order to attract foreign capital. The most 
important challenge experienced by the global economy is the attempt by 
international financial institutions and the West to impose free-market capitalism 
on the rest of the world (Siddiqui, 2015c). With the policy and support from 
financial capital separated from production could force further de-regulation of 
capital relations, supplying the finance from productive capital to move around the 
globe in search of higher profitable locations. 
Globalisation has huge potential and benefits, but also enormous challenges and 
risks. As Joseph Stiglitz (2003) points out in the case of the 1997 East Asian crisis, 
where more openness and integration was seen as opportunity, while the risks were 
ignored and the consequences were grave: ‚Incomes fell by 20-30%, GDP fell by 
15-20% in some East Asian countries. The IMF was supposedly created …to 
provide countries with liquidity to finance fiscal expenditures to reduce the 
magnitude of economic downturns; yet it is clear that the policies that were 
imposed by the global institutions like the IMF exacerbated that downturn…, the 
IMF had different objectives – they were not as concerned with the maintaining the 
strength of the economies in the region as in preventing a default against Western 
banks‛ (Stiglitz, 2003: 6). 
The mainstream economists argue that capital liberalisation is that it enhances 
competition and disciplines the market, which is expected to have positive effects 
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on economic growth. However, it misses other major points, as Stiglitz (2004) 
warns: ‚During the early 1990s, for instance, throughout Latin America, capital 
flows… helped to finance rapid increases in consumption (both public and private). 
Better measures of economic performance (which would have taken note of the 
increased indebtedness and the transfer of ownership of assets to foreigners) might 
have provided some warnings that things were not as rosy as GDP indicators 
suggested. To that extent that governments are short-sighted, they have every 
incentive to take advantage of the further increases in consumption and the 
loosening of budget constraints that financial-market liberalization provides in a 
boom-putting little weight on consequences for the future‛ (Stiglitz, 2004: 62). 
Some have claimed that globalisation has led to integrated global markets. ‚For 
production, capital flows and trade, the wold economy is increasingly one, and 
national markets are being replaced by global markets. Global markets are 
becoming the natural strategic horizon for major corporations, investors and 
speculators. It should not be forgotten that, not only in absolute figures but also a 
relative share of the world population, more people are working under capitalist 
relations than ever before in the history… In little more than a decade most of the 
non-OECD wold, comprising four-fifths of the world’s population, has moved to 
privatize, liberalize and deregulate, and is moving to compete actively on world 
markets‛ (Went, 2002:8). However, the internalisation of the global economy is 
taking place unevenly because its effects on growth vary in different regions and 
countries. Despite various attempts, still the (not yet) world economy has not been 
fully integrated due to all sorts of protectionism. The labour markets in particular 
can hardly be said to comprise a global market.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Globalisation is seen as the opening of national markets and further integration 
of production and increased operations of the MNCs. It simply means nation-states 
are not able to influence the exports and imports of goods and capital. As Martin 
Wolf of the London based Financial Times (London) has emphasised: ‚It cannot 
make sense to fragment the world economy more than it already is but rather to 
make the world economy work as if it were the United States, or at least the 
European Union …The failure of our world is not that there is too much 
globalisation, but that there is too little. The potential for greater economic 
integration is barely tapped… Social democrats, classical liberals and democratic 
conservatives should unite to preserve and improve the liberal global economy 
against the enemies mustering both outside and inside the gates‛ (Wolf, 2004: 4). 
The first phase of the globalisation (1860-1914) is characterised by the 
integration of markets and capital across countries through the exchange of goods 
and services and movements of labour across borders, largely in white settlement 
countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. The 
second phase (from early 1980s) is characterised by the integration of production 
and the establishment of subsidiaries and joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions 
in manufacturing and services in the developing countries. We find cross-border 
movements of not only goods, but also capital, technology, ideas and management 
practices, and services, whilst more complex relations were built up in this period, 
most visibly in the East Asian countries including China.  
This study finds that international institutions’ overriding preoccupation is with 
higher economic growth which makes little sense without recognising that the 
development model produces luxury shopping malls rather than primary health 
centres and primary schools that ensure millions of healthy lives. Economic growth 
without investment in human development is unsustainable.  
However, this current study has argued that free trade model is both 
theoretically and empirically weak. There seems to be no doubt that globalisation 
has opened up a number of beneficial avenues for those countries, who are 
conducive to innovation and entrepreneurship. In the developing countries the 
fundamental problem of unemployment, inequality and poverty persists and a more 
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integrated economy under current globalisation will not be successful in resolving 
these challenges and problems facing the people in developing countries. This 
study advocates in favour of increased investment in social sectors and to cherish 
the value of pluralism and national economic sovereignty. 
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